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Abstract 
Over the last decade, the UK has experienced unprecedented increases in migration 
associated with the 2004 A8 expansion of the European Union. These migrant workers have 
been praised by managers in the UK, who have frequently stated that they perceive these 
workers to have a strong ‘work ethic’ when measured on aspects such as absence from work 
rates. This article examines this perceived migrant ‘work ethic’ by analysing worker absence 
data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey for the period 2005-2012. Regression 
analysis reveals that when A8 migrant workers first arrive in the UK, they record 
substantially lower absence than native workers, but that these migrant absence levels 
assimilate within 2-4 years. If employers use this information to make hiring decisions, this 
may have negative implications for native workers, but, importantly, only in the short run.  
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Introduction 
 
On 1 May 2004 the European Union was expanded to include the A8 nations of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Since their entry into the United Kingdom labour market, this new group of 
workers has been lauded by employers as having what has been described as a stronger “work 
ethic” than workers from the UK. Within the academic literature, recent qualitative evidence 
studying managers’ views of the migrant work ethic, particularly through observations on 
sickness absence, suggest that the work ethic of migrants was perceived by these managers 
to be higher than that of native workers (see, for example MacKenzie and Forde, 2009; 
Matthews and Ruhs, 2007; Tannock, 2013). Despite these voluminous qualitative findings, 
however, quantitative evidence that substantiates these employer perceptions of a distinctive 
migrant work ethic is scant.  
 
Using worker absence data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) covering 
the period 2005 to 2012, this article presents the first quantitative investigation into the 
migrant work ethic. While the literature recognises that work ethic is a multi-dimensional 
concept, absence from work has previously been identified by managers within the 
qualitative research literature as being an important measure of work ethic (MacKenzie and 
Forde, 2009; Tannock, 2013). Absence from work has also been extensively used as a 
measure of work effort within the labour economics literature, especially when examining 
the increased levels of effort (i.e. lower absence) that temporary workers exert in order to 
increase their chances of being offered a permanent contract (see Bradley et al., 2014; 
Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005).1 
 
 
 
4 
 
The theoretical framework presented in this article asserts that recent A8 migrants face 
certain disadvantages in the UK labour market relative to comparable natives, despite their 
higher levels of human capital as evidenced, for example, with their higher levels of 
qualifications (Hopkins and Dawson, 2016; Wadsworth, 2015). It is argued that these 
disadvantages weaken the labour market power of A8 migrants (Vershinina et al., 2011), 
providing them with an incentive to exert more work effort. Firstly, recent migrants have 
limited labour market information about the host country; while, on the demand side, UK 
employers are unaware of the value of migrant characteristics, such as education and other 
work-related characteristics, if obtained outside of the UK (Clark and Drinkwater, 2008). 
This latter factor has also been found in workplace studies (Hopkins et al., 2016), and is the 
result of both the diversity of qualifications across eight different educational systems, and 
also the lack of information provided to businesses because of the initially low predictions 
of the number of additional migrants that would enter into the UK (as also found in Hopkins, 
2017). Secondly, many recent migrants possess low levels of English language proficiency 
which will hinder their labour market outcomes, as these migrants are unable to obtain 
employment that adequately reflects their particular skills.2 In this view, language skills are 
seen as complementary to job related skills and both are needed in order to match workers 
with jobs that reflect their skill set (Dustmann et al., 2013; Eckstein and Weiss, 2004). A 
particular consequence of these disadvantages and information asymmetries is that migrants 
are unable to signal ex ante, i.e. when applying for a job, their underlying productivity to 
employers through the traditional channels, such as education (Spence, 1973) and labour 
market experience. As such, this article argues that recent migrants have an incentive to find 
new ex post, i.e. after being employed, methods of signalling productivity to employers in 
order to progress from low skilled, low paying roles and into employment positions 
that better reflect their skill sets. In this view, migrant workers signal productivity through a 
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stronger work ethic and, within the context of this study, through lower absenteeism. This 
signalling of effort will be over and above that required to signal underlying productivity 
when UK employers are fully informed about migrant characteristics.  
 
According to the migrant assimilation model pioneered by Chiswick (1978), the employment 
outcomes of migrants (e.g. their earnings from work) will converge to those of natives as 
migrants acquire language skills, labour market information, and skills specific to industries 
in the host nation over the years following arrival. In line with the predictions of the 
“assimilationist” model, this article also assesses the assimilation of the migrant work ethic. 
In short, if a longer residency in the UK improves the employment outcomes of migrants, 
then these migrants will no longer have an incentive to signal productivity through 
behaviours associated with a stronger work ethic. 
 
 
Background  
 
The current UK context following the A8 EU expansion of 2004 makes the UK a suitable 
arena for the study of the links between migration and perceived work ethic (Anderson, 
2010). The issue of migrant labour has become particularly important in the UK following 
the A8 expansion of 2004, where eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) nations joined 
an expanded EU (Ciupijus, 2011). These countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Whereas other member states imposed 
restrictions of up to seven years, Sweden, the Republic of Ireland and the UK were the only 
three EU member states to allow full access to workers from the A8 nations to work without 
restriction. The UK government’s decision was influenced by an original predicted figure of 
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increased migration as a result of the expansion of between eight and thirteen thousand 
(Dustmann et al., 2003), and as such the only requirement for A8 migrants to take work in 
the UK was to register on the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). By the time this scheme 
was closed in April 2011, seven years since the A8 expansion, over a million people had 
registered. Clark and Drinkwater (2008) show that these changes saw the proportion of the 
total number of migrants and immigrants to the UK from the A8 countries rise from 4.1% of 
the total in 2000-2003 to 36.5% of the total in 2004-2007.  While there are different reasons 
to migrate, as examined by Eade et al. (2007) and Hopkins et al. (2016), in-depth qualitative 
studies have found that a recurring story among A8 migrants is of highly qualified people 
taking lower skilled roles. These migrants are found in sectors such as hospitality (Alberti, 
2014; McDowell et al., 2008) and manufacturing (Hopkins et al., 2016; Tannock, 2013), 
particularly in roles where interaction with customers is not required (for example, in 
distribution warehouses or back of house roles in hospitality). A notable feature of these 
sectors is the use of deskilled work practices, which demotes the importance of English 
language proficiency.  A further recurring theme is that of managers comparing these migrant 
workers to those from the UK using the term ‘work ethic’ as a differentiator, which we now 
examine in greater detail. 
 
 
Theoretical framework and empirical literature 
 
One of the key themes that has emerged from workplace studies of migrant workers is a 
preference among managers for A8 migrant workers over native workers (see e.g.  
MacKenzie and Forde, 2009; Tannock, 2013). One explanation for this may be the 
opportunity to pay lower wages to migrant workers.  However, in the context of minimum 
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wage legislation that limits this opportunity, managers cite the stronger migrant work ethic 
as a key reason for choosing migrants over native workers. But what is this work ethic? 
Managers repeatedly pointed to low absence in particular, with Hopkins’s (2014) study of 
absence management finding that managers consider A8 migrants to take less sickness 
absence than their UK colleagues. Hopkins (2014) also examined the influences of factors 
other than ill health on absence, following Edwards and Scullion’s (1982) view that absence 
must also be considered as a response to managerial control. Qualitative evidence from 
workplace studies, such as those of MacKenzie and Forde (2009) and Tannock (2013), 
reveals that managers propose a link between this work ethic and migration and, as a result, 
they prefer migrant to native workers. Matthews and Ruhs (2007) suggest that in lower 
skilled roles employers will actually prefer a ‘good work ethic’ over more recognisable 
qualifications or skills. This creates complex hierarchies among potential recruits, where 
“workers are often – and in some cases primarily – distinguished and recruited on the basis 
of their nationality” (Matthews and Ruhs, 2007: 29).  These findings in the UK match with 
previous research in other countries, for example that of Chiswick (1978) and Waldinger and 
Lichter (2003), who find a preference for migrant workers among US managers. Waldinger 
and Lichter (2003: 176) find that managers reported that they preferred Latino migrants as 
they “liked to work”, while African Americans were reported to be too “Americanized” and 
thus more likely to demand higher wages and better conditions. 
 
Within the context of this article, it is argued that the stronger migrant work ethic is directly 
linked to migrant labour market power and, in particular, low levels of English language 
proficiency and issues around the portability of qualifications. This is despite the higher 
levels of human capital among this group, as evidenced by higher levels of qualifications 
(Hopkins and Dawson, 2016; Wadsworth, 2015). Firstly, migrants may endeavour to negate 
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these issues by being more compliant to the demands of employers, which is often termed by 
these employers as the ‘migrant work ethic’ (see, for example, MacKenzie and Forde, 2009). 
Secondly, a particular consequence of lower migrant labour market power is that migrants 
are forced to supply labour in low-paying, low-skilled employment positions, which do not 
adequately reflect their particular skills (McCollum and Findlay, 2015). More specifically, 
Clark and Drinkwater (2008) find that recent migrants from the A8 countries have the lowest 
returns to their skills, and relate this to the issue of English language proficiency. Related to 
this, Dustmann and Faber (2005) find that language proficiency is lowest among those groups 
that have the largest disadvantages in the labour market. In conjunction with language 
proficiency, Friedberg (2000) argues that another reason for this poor ability to obtain higher 
skilled roles is a lack of portability of skills and qualifications between countries, with 
managers unaware of the value of these if they are earned outside the host nation (see also 
Clark and Drinkwater, 2008; Dustmann and Faber, 2005; Dustmann et al., 2013; Eckstein 
and Weiss, 2004). Although this would also be the case for migrant workers from other EU 
nations, workplace studies have confirmed the diversity of qualifications across the eight new 
accession states as contributing to the lack of portability (Hopkins, 2017). This is a 
contributory factor in the majority of recent migrant workers in the UK taking low-skill jobs 
(Alberti, 2014), despite their relatively high levels of formal education (Hopkins and 
Dawson, 2016). Wadsworth (2015) finds that the immigrant workforce in the UK is better 
qualified than the native workforce – for example, 46 percent of the UK-born workforce left 
school aged 16 or younger, compared to 8 percent of the A8 migrant workforce.  
 
Within this context, a stronger migrant work ethic, for example through lower work absence, 
enables migrants to signal their underlying productivity to employers. While signalling 
usually takes place ex ante (e.g. Spence, 1973), as UK employers are not fully informed of 
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the value of migrant qualifications (Friedberg, 2000; Clark and Drinkwater, 2008) then 
migrants will have to find an alternative way of demonstrating their skills and commitment 
ex post, and signalling this through, in particular, lower levels of absence. As a comparison, 
Bradley et al. (2014) show that those on a probationary contract will demonstrate a superior 
work ethic through lower absence in an attempt to increase their chances of gaining a 
permanent contract. This signalling can therefore be seen as an attempt by individuals to 
overcome asymmetries of information and, for high-productivity migrant workers, to 
demonstrate to employers that they truly are more productive in order to be reallocated into 
more highly-skilled roles which adequately reflect their particular skill sets. 
 
While recent A8 migrants are likely to face disadvantages in the UK labour market relative 
to comparable natives, the pioneering work of Chiswick (1978) showed that, although 
immigrants earn less than natives when first arriving, there was equality of earnings for 
immigrants in the US ten to fifteen years following their arrival (although this varied across 
ethnicities, with Mexican-born immigrants performing less well). The “assimilationist” 
interpretation of this finding is that, after arrival, migrants will accumulate language skills, 
labour market information, and other skills specific to industries in the host country. 
Moreover, employers may have greater information concerning the work-related 
characteristics of these migrant workers. The accumulation of these skills is expected to 
increase the labour market power of migrants, leading to better employment prospects and 
to the assimilation of migrant wages. Empirical evidence consistent with this assimilation is 
provided by Clark and Lindley (2009) and Dickens and McKnight (2008). As this labour 
market assimilation process occurs, migrants will no longer have an incentive to signal 
productivity through additional effort, therefore their reliance on signalling through, for 
example, lower absence, will lessen.  
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Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Data source and sample 
 
In order to study the A8 migrant work ethic, data drawn from the October-December rounds 
(fourth quarter) of the QLFS for the years 2005-2015 are utilized. The QLFS is particularly 
rich in information concerning working hours and absence from work and this information 
can be used to construct absence measures that proxy the work ethic of individuals working 
in the UK. The QLFS has a rotating panel structure, where each household member of the 
sample is interviewed for five consecutive quarters/waves. Wave five responses are excluded 
from the final sample to avoid duplicate observations for respondents that were observed in 
their first wave in the previous year.3 The sample is also further restricted to employees that 
are either UK nationals or A8 migrants. In the latter group, only migrants that arrived in the 
UK in or after 2004 are included, in order to specifically study the wave of migration from 
the A8 countries after the enlargement of the EU in that year. Workers that are full-time 
students, those that are under 16 years of age or above the state pension age (64 for men, 59 
for women), and those that report over 90 usual weekly hours (to remove extreme and/or 
invalid information), are also excluded. Finally, as the QLFS allows interviewers to collect 
information by proxy, i.e. from another related adult in the household, we exclude these 
responses from our analysis owing to potential measurement error.  
 
In the estimations, four work absence measures are considered as dependent variables: (1) 
the sickness absence probability, (2) the sickness absence rate, (3) the overall absence 
probability, and (4) the overall absence rate. To construct these measures, the procedure 
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outlined in Barmby et al. (2004) has been followed. First, an absence rate is calculated for 
each individual in the sample as follows: let UHi denote the usual hours the employee i works 
in a week, excluding any overtime work. This is assumed to correspond to the hours the 
individual is contracted to work. AHi denotes the actual hours the same employee worked in 
the reference week of the survey, again excluding any overtime. Those respondents who 
reported working fewer hours than usual during the reference week were asked a follow-up 
question regarding the reason for this. The exact wording of the QLFS question is as follows: 
 
“What was the main reason that you did fewer hours than usual/were away from work 
in the week ending Sunday the …..? 
 
1. Number of hours worked/overtime varies 
2. Bank holiday 
3. Maternity or paternity leave 
4. Parental leave 
5. Other leave/holiday 
6. Sick or injured 
7. Attending a training course away from own workplace 
8. Started new job/ changed jobs 
9. Ended job and did not start new one that week 
10.  Laid off/short time/work interrupted by bad weather 
11.  Laid off/short time/work interrupted by labour dispute at own workplace 
12.  Laid off/short time/work interrupted by economic and other causes 
13.  Other personal/family reasons 
14.  Other reasons” 
 
(Source: QLFS questionnaire, 2012) 
 
A dummy variable 𝑠𝑖
𝑗
is then created, which takes the value of 1 if the individual’s response 
was j = sick or injured (option 6) in the question above, and 0 otherwise. For the case of 
overall absence, 𝑠𝑖
𝑗
 = 1 if the individual’s response was j = sick or injured (option 6), or other 
personal/family reasons (option 13), or other reasons (option 14), and 0 otherwise.4  
 
By using all the above variables, the sickness or overall absence rate, 𝑅𝑖
𝑗
, for each individual 
i is constructed as follows:  
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 𝑅𝑖
𝑗 =
(𝑈𝐻𝑖−𝐴𝐻𝑖)𝑠𝑖
𝑗
𝐴𝐻𝑖(1−𝑠𝑖
𝑗
)+𝑈𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝑗    (1) 
 
where 0 ≤ 𝑅𝑖
𝑗
≤ 1 for each i. This variable measures the proportion of weekly hours lost owing 
to the reasons mentioned above and is the sickness absence rate or overall absence rate, 
depending on how 𝑠𝑖
𝑗
is calculated. By using this rate, we can also construct our sickness and 
overall absence probability measures. These are discrete variables taking the value of 1 if 
the respective absence rate is positive (and 0 otherwise) and they effectively measure the 
incidence of at least one hour of absence in the reference week.  
 
In the multiple regression analysis, linear models for the four dependent variables are 
estimated to investigate whether A8 migrants record more or less absence from work than 
UK nationals.5 As well as including in the model a dummy variable indicating whether the 
individual is an A8 migrant, an interaction of this with a variable that measures the number 
of years an A8 migrant has resided in the UK since migration is also included. The coefficient 
of the A8 dummy, therefore, measures the absence differential between a UK national and 
an A8 migrant that arrived in the UK in the same year as the one he/she is observed in the 
QLFS, while the coefficient of the interaction term measures the rate of absence assimilation 
as residency in the UK lengthens for A8 migrants.6  
 
In order to account for the heterogeneity in both personal and labour market circumstances 
between the A8 migrants and UK nationals, a standard barrage of control variables is 
included in the regression models. Basic demographic variables include gender, age (and its 
square), education (in years)7, marital status, number of dependent children under 16 years 
 
 
13 
 
old, and age of the youngest dependent child. Health status, an important variable in all work 
absence studies (see e.g. Leigh, 1991), is also included and is captured by two dummies 
indicating (1) whether the respondent suffers from a long-term health problem, and (2) if that 
problem affects the amount of work for the employee. A series of region of residence and 
year dummies are also included to control for regional variations in weather conditions and 
other relevant variations by place and time. Finally, housing tenure and receipt of any state 
benefits or tax credits are included in the models in order to capture access to the welfare 
state.8 These are important controls since A8 migrants were not eligible for tax credits before 
registering with the WRS, while they also could not claim any income-related benefits before 
having worked continuously for one year (Dustmann et al., 2010: 6). This limited access to 
the welfare state is, in turn, expected to affect migrant work effort (see also Hansen and 
Lofstrom, 2011). To account for possible differential effects of benefits receipt on UK 
nationals and A8 migrants, an interaction term is added in the models.     
 
Labour market heterogeneity is captured through a series of control variables including: usual 
basic weekly hours worked, paid and unpaid overtime hours, whether the employee works in 
the public sector, has a second job, a permanent contract, a managerial or supervisory status, 
whether the employee works at home (or in the same building as his/her home), tenure with 
current employer, establishment size (see e.g. Barmby and Stephan, 2000), trade union status 
(see e.g. Allen, 1984) and flexible working arrangements (see e.g. Heywood and Miller, 
2015). A series of occupational and industry dummies are also included in the models.9 
Finally, since job dissatisfaction is a much studied variable in the work absence literature 
(see Steers and Rhodes, 1978), it is proxied here by the following variables: (1) a variable 
that captures dissatisfaction with current working hours (“Fewer hours desired”); (2) a 
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dummy indicating whether the employee is looking for an extra job; and (3) a dummy taking 
the value of one if the respondent is looking for a new job.  
 
All the above variables are included in the final models, with their corresponding sample 
means available in Table A1 of the Appendix. A final sample of 113,804 observations is 
obtained after dropping individuals with missing observations for any of the dependent or 
independent variables. 112,408 of these (98.8 percent of the total) correspond to UK nationals 
and 1,396 (1.2 percent) to A8 migrants. The average UK residency of A8 migrants in the 
final sample is approximately 3.1 years. The full distribution of migrant UK residency is 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
Descriptive evidence 
 
Before presenting the ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates, the raw differences 
in work absence between the native and migrant samples are briefly considered. Table 1 
presents the relevant sample means. Crucially, A8 migrants are less likely to be absent from 
work and also record lower levels of absence than UK nationals. T-tests are performed for 
the difference in means between the groups; they are highly significant, confirming the 
differences in each case. These differences are not small; in particular, all absence sample 
means are 70-90 percent higher for UK nationals, providing prima facie evidence in favour 
of a better work ethic among A8 migrant workers.  
 
[Table 1] 
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Table A1 in the Appendix also shows that A8 migrants have on average 2 more years of 
education than their UK national counterparts. Migrants are also younger, healthier, more 
likely to work in a temporary full-time job, less likely to have managerial or supervisory 
duties in their job, less likely to be unionized, and have on average a shorter tenure with their 
current employer than UK nationals. Consistent with the literature on the disadvantages faced 
by A8 migrants in the UK labour market, A8 migrants face a substantial hourly wage penalty 
relative to natives and their work is heavily concentrated in low-skilled occupations. Around 
63 percent of A8 migrants work as plant and machine operatives or in elementary 
occupations, while the corresponding percentage for UK nationals is only around 16 percent. 
A8 migrants also exhibit a lower amount of dissatisfaction with current working hours, 
although they work substantially more hours (basic and paid overtime) than UK nationals.  
 
 
Regression results 
 
A8 Migrants and Work Ethic 
 
In view of the above differences in personal and job characteristics between the two groups, 
regression analysis is employed in order to control for these differences and therefore to 
compare the work ethic of observationally similar UK national and A8 migrant workers. 
Table 2 presents the estimates. As the main focus of the paper involves the comparison of 
absence levels between natives and migrants and, furthermore, the assimilation of these 
levels as UK residency increases, only these core results are presented in the table. 
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[Table 2] 
 
A common pattern can be observed in all the estimated models in Table 2, confirming the 
conclusions drawn from the descriptive analysis presented above: A8 migrants record 
substantially lower absence incidence and rates than natives. In particular, the A8 migrant 
sickness absence probability is 3.3 percentage points smaller than for an, observationally 
similar, UK national. Relative to the mean level of a UK national’s sickness absence 
probability (4.3 percent), this difference corresponds to a more than three times lower 
probability of absence for A8 migrants. Substantial (and of similar magnitude) differences 
are also estimated for the rest of the absence measures.  
 
However, as mentioned above, owing to the presence of the interaction of the A8 dummy 
with the variable measuring the length of residence in the UK, the above differences 
correspond to the comparison of a UK national with an A8 migrant that arrived in the UK in 
the same year as the one observed in the QLFS. Evidence in favour of an assimilation pattern 
in work ethic is, thus, given by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the 
interaction term in all estimated models. Specifically, the results indicate that the UK-A8 
absence differential reduces in size with length of residency in the UK and becomes 
statistically insignificant after three or four years of residence, depending on the model. A 
similar pattern is observed in Figure 2, which plots the relevant coefficients and the 
corresponding confidence intervals from regression models with a more flexible functional 
form, where separate coefficients are estimated for A8 migrants for each year of length of 
residency observed in the data.10 The results here indicate that after 2-4 years in the UK, A8 
migrants record similar levels of sickness and overall absence to observationally equivalent 
UK nationals.  
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 [Figure 2] 
 
Work Ethic and Labour Market Power 
 
The migrant assimilation model suggests that migrants acquire UK-specific skills over the 
years following arrival, leading to the assimilation of migrant employment prospects and 
wages. While the data presented in Table A1 in the Appendix reveal that A8 migrants do 
indeed face a substantial wage penalty relative to natives despite their higher levels of 
education (reflecting their lower levels of labour market power), do the labour market 
outcomes of A8 migrants assimilate and, thus, help also explain the assimilation of the 
migrant work ethic? In addressing this question, the wage assimilation of migrants is now 
examined. It should be noted here that earnings are not the only indicator of migrants’ labour 
market assimilation. Previous studies (Chiswick et al., 1997; Clark and Lindley, 2009) have 
investigated the assimilation of migrants’ ability to find employment relative to natives. 
Wages are, however, likely to give a more complete picture, as earnings capture the quality 
of employment found by migrant workers. 
 
Examining the wage assimilation of A8 migrants using the baseline sample presents, 
however, important technical difficulties. Owing to the availability of earnings information 
only for employees that are observed in their first (and fifth, which has been excluded from 
the analysis) wave in the QLFS, only around 25 percent of the cases in the baseline sample 
(about 29,000 observations) can be used for the study of wages. This seriously reduces the 
number of A8 migrants observed with earnings information (425 observations). For this 
reason, two relatively parsimonious model specifications are estimated in order to examine 
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the wage assimilation of A8 migrants. The migrant variables are constructed now by splitting 
the A8 sample in only two groups, those with up to 3 years of residency in the UK and those 
with 4-8 years of residency. This is done to ensure that each group consists of a sufficient 
number of A8 migrants’ observations for the A8-UK wage gap to be precisely estimated. The 
dependent variable in both specifications is the log of the real hourly wage. In the first 
specification, the unadjusted wage gaps are estimated, including no further controls in the 
model apart from the two migrant dummies. However, since wages are determined by a 
number of factors that may themselves be correlated with migrant status or years of residency 
in the UK, the results from a multiple regression model of assimilation are also presented. 
This latter model assumes wages are determined by the following influences: gender, current 
age in quadratic form, marital status, education, health, and a set of survey year and region 
of residence dummy variables. Job characteristics such as industry and occupation are not 
included as these will capture part of the process through which A8 migrants increase their 
earnings.11  
 
Table 3 presents the results. It shows that newly arrived migrants (0-3 years in the UK) face 
a substantial wage penalty when compared to UK natives. Importantly, there is also some 
evidence of a reduction in this penalty, since the coefficient for migrants with longer UK 
residency (4-8 years) is smaller in (absolute) size, and significantly so. This result holds for 
both specifications. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
While A8 migrants’ wages may not have fully assimilated to those of UK natives, these 
migrants may also have assimilated in other unobservable ways which may help to explain 
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the assimilation of the migrant work ethic. Firstly, migrants may culturally assimilate into 
their host nation, by adopting social norms and subsequently behaving more like natives. For 
example, the General Manager at MacKenzie and Forde’s (2009: 150) workplace study of 
‘Glassfix’ stated that “There was a tail off in the Balkan staff, then all of a sudden there was 
an influx of Poles…50 percent of the accession nationalities are Poles. They are very good”, 
with the managing director agreeing that “they have a good work ethic”. However, as the 
Balkan staff had been in the UK for a longer period of time, the managing director of 
‘Glassfix’ found that “The Balkan workers were sharper when it came to money and benefits, 
a lot of the Kosovans had been around a long time, they were more ‘Westernized’. They 
knew about benefits, knew it was better to draw off benefits – like the English.” In addition, 
Waldinger and Lichter (2003: 176) found that US managers reported that they felt African 
Americans were too “Americanized”, and thus more likely to demand higher wages and 
better conditions (see also Chiswick, 1978).  
 
Secondly, migrant wage expectations may assimilate, consistent with the dual labour market 
hypothesis and the migrant ‘frame of reference’ (Piore, 1979). More specifically, suppose 
that everyone initially sets reservation wages with the belief that they will most likely earn 
the average of those with the same educational background and other observable 
characteristics. However, when migrants are added to the UK labour supply, their ‘frame of 
reference’ is usually the labour market in their home countries, meaning that their wage 
expectations are significantly lower than those of native workers. So, while recent A8 
migrants face a substantial wage penalty relative to natives, wages may still remain 
significantly above expectations and may therefore be associated with higher worker effort 
according to a ‘fair wage-effort’ hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), which states that 
workers should withdraw effort if their actual wage falls short of what they consider a fair 
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wage. This is especially likely for the most recent of A8 migrant workers who are less 
embedded in the UK labour market. Accordingly, as migrants’ experience and knowledge of 
the UK labour market increase, their ‘frame of reference’ is likely to shift and, as such, wage 
expectations will adjust accordingly. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
The UK has experienced unprecedented increases in migration in recent years, primarily 
associated with the entry of the A8 accession countries into the EU. These migrant workers 
arriving in the UK have been praised by employers as having a stronger work ethic than 
native workers. Using worker absence data from the QLFS for the period 2005-2012, and 
considering migrants from the recent 2004 A8 expansion, this article provides quantitative 
evidence that substantiates these perceptions of this distinctive migrant work ethic. The key 
finding of this article is that A8 migrants record around three times lower worker absence 
than natives in their first year of residency in the UK. What is a particularly interesting result 
is that it takes migrants between 2 and 4 years to eradicate this difference.  
 
It has been argued throughout this study that this migrant work ethic is a result of the lower 
levels of labour market power faced by this recent group of migrants, despite their higher 
levels of human capital, as evidenced through their higher qualification levels than UK 
natives (Wadsworth, 2015). In particular, low levels of English language proficiency see 
migrants moving into lower-skilled roles that are not customer facing, frequently on non-
standard contracts and crowded into a small range of sectors (Hopkins and Dawson, 2016).  
It is this low labour market power that provides the incentive for migrant workers to exert 
 
 
21 
 
increased effort through reduced absence, in order to signal to employers their underlying 
productivity. In line with this view and that of the traditional migrant assimilation model, it 
was proposed that the observed assimilation of the migrant work ethic would reflect the 
increasing levels of labour market power and employment prospects of more embedded 
migrants. Consistent with this, the modelling of the wage assimilation of A8 migrants 
suggested that these migrant workers face a substantial wage penalty relative to natives when 
first arriving in the UK, despite their higher levels of education. Importantly, this wage 
penalty was found to decline in magnitude as migrant residency in the UK increased. 
However, while A8 absence levels were found to fully assimilate to those of natives, wages 
do not. Migrants, thus, may have assimilated in other ways, particularly through adopting the 
social norms of natives or via converging wage expectations. It is left for future work to 
analyse whether A8 migrants do eventually assimilate in terms of their labour market 
outcomes, given a longer time frame. 
 
While the evidence in this study points to the assimilation of migrant effort levels, there are, 
however, several limitations of the data that should be noted. Principally, the use of cross-
sectional data in studies of migrant wage assimilation has been criticised owing to both cohort 
effects and the attrition of ‘below-average’ migrants (Borjas, 1985). The former criticism 
reflects the changing quality of migrants into the host nation. If, for example, there was an 
improvement in the quality of A8 migrants entering the UK over time, we may expect this to 
impact upon work effort levels observed in the sample. It does, however, seem unlikely that 
cohort effects are important within the context of this study, since only a short wave of 
migration is investigated. Furthermore, if ‘below-average’ A8 migrants are the first to return 
home, it is not obvious how this migrant attrition may bias the absence results. On the one 
hand, ‘better than average’ migrants may have more perseverance, which is likely to be 
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associated with reduced absenteeism. On the other hand, ‘better than average’ migrants may 
be those that are more able to adapt their skill sets to the UK labour market and, therefore, 
will have a weaker incentive to signal to employers their underlying productivity through 
reduced absenteeism. Only with the use of appropriate longitudinal data, that can track effort 
convergence for particular migrants, could these methodological issues be addressed.12  
 
If the estimates presented above are taken at face value, then our findings are in line with 
qualitative evidence based upon managers’ perceptions of the migrant work ethic. If 
managers use this information upon which to base their hiring decisions, then this may have 
negative implications for unusually productive native workers. These conditions seem likely 
to hold particularly in low-skilled, low-paying industries where employers regularly use 
deskilled work practices which demote the importance of English language proficiency. The 
raw data presented within this study (see Table A1 in the Appendix) report a large 
concentration of A8 migrants within elementary occupations, and therefore these migrants 
will be more likely to operate in roles where employers have a preference for a ‘good work 
ethic’ over more recognisable qualifications or skills (Matthews and Ruhs, 2007). While 
managers may distinguish among workers on the basis of readily available information such 
as nationality, the assimilation of the migrant work ethic, however, will lead employers to 
switch away from more established migrants towards newer groups. Indeed, findings from 
qualitative investigations of A8 migrant workers in the UK report managers stating that “We 
are looking forward to the next round of accession states” and “We’ll be picking up new 
nationalities” (MacKenzie and Forde, 2009: 149), showing that this perception of work ethic 
among different nationalities affects organisations’ recruitment behaviours (MacKenzie and 
Forde, 2009; Tannock, 2013). These findings imply that this form of ‘statistical 
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discrimination’ may have adverse effects for native workers in the short run, but, importantly, 
this may only be a short run effect. 
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Endnotes
1 Throughout this article, it is argued that absence from work is a reasonable proxy of work ethic. This measure 
is the best available in our data source and can provide useful insights that are consistent with our theoretical 
framework set out below. Other relevant proxies, e.g. work intensity, are not available in the dataset. 
2 According to the Office for National Statistics, only around 70% of the Polish- and Latvian-speaking 
population in England and Wales can speak English “very well” or “well” (ONS, 2013).   
3 An alternative sample selection procedure would be to combine data from all quarters and only select 
individuals in their first wave in the survey to avoid repeated observations. However, certain variables used in 
the analysis (e.g. trade union status and flexible working arrangements) are only available in the October-
December quarters of each year. Finally, all results presented below are based on unweighted data. Using 
weights to account for non-response and make the QLFS samples representative of the UK population, 
produced nearly identical results.  
4 Employees that did not work fewer hours than usual in their reference week do not answer this question. 
Hence, 𝑠𝑖
𝑗
= 0 for these individuals. Other reasons for absence can include a variety of factors, ranging from 
dealing with a personal/family errand to pure shirking. These, of course, are closely related to the concept of 
effort we want to capture, and complement the more multifaceted phenomenon of sickness absence.     
5 Though the appropriate models would be binary choice ones in the case of the discrete dependent variables, 
we choose to present results from linear models estimated by OLS for ease of interpretation. The estimation of 
non-linear models for the two binary dependent variables gave qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. 
Moreover, the two fractional dependent variables (the absence rates) can also cause problems in standard 
statistical analysis. However, the estimation of fractional probit models also gave very similar results. 
6 For the model to be estimated, UK nationals are assigned a value of zero for the Years in UK variable. 
7 Education is captured as a continuous variable, computed from the age an individual left full-time education 
minus six. The QLFS does provide an alternative coding framework based on the UK education system. 
However, up to 2010, foreign qualifications were only recorded as “other qualifications” in the QLFS, 
irrespective of their level. 
8 Benefits include: income support (not as an unemployed person), sickness or disability benefits, family related 
benefits, child benefits, housing/council tax benefits or rent rebate, tax credits or other. 
9 Note that a wage variable is not included in the final models. Although earnings should be an important 
determinant of absence through an opportunity cost of absence or an “efficiency wage” argument (whereby 
employers pay workers above the “market” wage in order to increase their effort/productivity and reduce the 
costs associated with turnover), the inclusion of a wage variable is likely to lead to simultaneity bias (see Allen, 
1984). Moreover, earnings questions are only asked to employees in their first and fifth wave in the LFS and 
the inclusion of the wage in the models would substantially decrease the final sample. We return to the issue of 
wages below. 
10 Due to the very small number of A8 migrants with eight years of UK residency in the sample (see Figure 1), 
a single dummy for seven or eight years of residency is used in these models.   
11 The use of cross-sectional data when analysing the assimilation of migrant wages has come under some 
scrutiny in the relevant literature (Borjas, 1985). Firstly, if there is a decrease in the quality of migrants 
belonging to different entry cohorts, migrant wage growth may be upward biased (Borjas, 1985). However, this 
typical shortcoming seems unlikely within the 9-year period examined here. Secondly, poorly performing 
migrants are typically the first to return home; consequently, the sample of A8 migrants with longer residency 
may be a selection of better than average migrants. This phenomenon would also lead to migrant wage growth 
being upward biased. An examination of such issues requires a longitudinal dataset and is out of the scope of 
this study.   
12 Future work can also extend the empirical analysis presented in this article to other migrant groups from 
different countries of origin. This may also shed light on the issue of English-language proficiency by 
examining the behavior of migrants from English-speaking countries.   
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Figure 1: Distribution of A8 Migrants by Years of Migrant Residency in the UK 
 
Source: UK QLFS 2005-2012. 
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Table 1: Absence from work by nationality 
 
Variable UK Nationals A8 Migrants  
   
Sickness Absence Probability 0.043 0.024*** 
Sickness Absence Rate 0.031 0.018*** 
Overall Absence Probability 0.053 0.028*** 
Overall Absence Rate 0.034 0.019*** 
   
Observations 112,408 1,396 
 
Source: UK QLFS 2005-2012.  
Notes: Numbers in table are sample means; *** t-test significant at 1%.  
 
 
Table 2: A8 migrants and work absence – Regression results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Sickness 
Absence 
Probability 
Sickness 
Absence 
Rate 
Overall 
Absence 
Probability 
Overall 
Absence 
Rate 
          
A8 -0.0333*** -0.0211*** -0.0354*** -0.0202*** 
 [0.0058] [0.0045] [0.0069] [0.0049] 
A8*(Years in UK) 0.0080*** 0.0063*** 0.0072*** 0.0059*** 
 [0.0021] [0.0018] [0.0022] [0.0018] 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Source: UK QLFS 2005-2012.  
Notes: Sample size for all models is 113,804 observations; OLS estimates; Huber-White (robust) standard errors in brackets; all 
models include controls for gender, age, age squared, marital status, health, education, number of dependent children, age of 
youngest dependent child, usual basic hours of work, paid and unpaid overtime hours, public sector, permanent contract, holding 
a second job, working from home, managerial status, looking for new job, looking for extra job, number of fewer working hours 
desired, job tenure, establishment size, trade union status, flexible working arrangements, housing tenure, claiming any benefits 
and its interaction with A8 migrant status, industry, occupation, region of residence and survey year; full results are available 
from the authors upon request. *** Significant at 1%.  
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Figure 2: A8-UK Absence Gaps by Years of Migrant Residency in the UK 
 
 
Source: UK QLFS 2005-2012.  
Notes: The bold lines show the estimate of the A8-UK coefficient for each length of residency in the UK; the dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals. 
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TABLE 3: Wage regression results 
 
(1) (2) 
A8 0-3 Years in UK -0.5213*** -0.5633***  
[0.0294] [0.0321] 
A8 4-8 Years in UK -0.4376*** -0.4812***  
[0.0242] [0.0249] 
   
Control variables No Yes 
F-test for equality of A8 dummies (p-value) 0.0266 0.0400 
 
Source: UK QLFS 2005-2012.  
Notes: Sample size for all models is 28,521 observations; dependent variable in both models is 
the log of the real hourly wage; OLS estimates; Huber-White (robust) standard errors are in 
brackets; controls include: female, age, age squared, education, marital status, health, survey 
year and region of residence dummies; full results are available from the authors upon request. 
*** Significant at 1%.  
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Table A1: Sample means for all variables by nationality 
 
Variable UK Nationals A8 Migrants 
 
Demographic characteristics 
 
  
Female 0.535 0.451*** 
Age 42.526 31.112*** 
Education (years) 11.905 14.044*** 
Long-term Health Problem 0.262 0.092*** 
Long-term Health Problem Limits Work 0.059 0.029*** 
Married or Cohabiting 0.687 0.633*** 
Number of dependent children <16 y.o. 0.592 0.473*** 
 
Dummy Variables for Age of youngest 
dependent child: 
  
1. 0-2 years 0.082 0.146*** 
2. 3-4 years 0.045 0.044 
3. 5-9 years 0.101 0.083** 
4. 10-15 years 0.133 0.061*** 
5. 16-18 years 0.046 0.014*** 
6. No child 0.592 0.652*** 
 
Job Characteristics 
 
  
Dummy Variables for Usual Basic Hours   
1. 1-15 0.058 0.015*** 
2. 16-29 0.178 0.099*** 
3. 30-35 0.159 0.082*** 
4. 36-40 0.489 0.620*** 
5. 41-48 0.072 0.134*** 
6. 48+ 0.043 0.050 
   
Public sector 0.326 0.055*** 
Paid Overtime Hours 1.143 2.384*** 
Unpaid Overtime Hours 1.792 0.214*** 
Holding Second Job 0.043 0.026*** 
Working from Home or Same Building 0.061 0.021*** 
Permanent Job 0.962 0.892*** 
Manager/Foreman/Supervisor 0.419 0.150*** 
Fewer Hours Desired (Number of hours) 1.049 0.261*** 
Looking for New Job 0.056 0.090*** 
Looking for Extra Job 0.008 0.015*** 
 
Dummy Variables for Establishment Size: 
  
1. Size 1-24 0.324 0.255*** 
2. Size 25-49 0.137 0.135 
3. Size 50-499 0.344 0.465*** 
4. Size 500+ 0.195 0.145*** 
 
Dummy Variables for one-digit occupation: 
  
1. Managers and S.O. 0.156 0.028*** 
2. Professionals 0.161 0.039*** 
3. Ass. Profess. And Technical 0.157 0.042*** 
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4. Administrative and Secretarial 0.142 0.051*** 
5. Skilled Trades 0.070 0.117*** 
6. Personal Services 0.090 0.068*** 
7. Sales and Customer Services 0.068 0.030*** 
8. Plant and Machine Operatives 0.062 0.226*** 
9. Elementary 0.094 0.400*** 
 
Tenure Dummies: 
  
1. 0-3 months 0.036 0.091*** 
2. 3-6 months 0.034 0.109*** 
3. 6-12 months 0.052 0.138*** 
4. 12-24 months 0.091 0.218*** 
5. 24-60 months 0.211 0.359*** 
6. 60+ months 0.575 0.085*** 
 
Dummy Variables for Industries: 
  
1. Agriculture and Fishing 0.006 0.024*** 
2. Energy and Water 0.016 0.011 
3. Manufacturing 0.127 0.297*** 
4. Construction 0.049 0.047 
5. Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants 0.160 0.261*** 
6. Transport and Communications 0.076 0.112*** 
7. Banking, Finance and Insurance 0.154 0.112*** 
8. Public Admin., Education and Health 0.368 0.105*** 
9. Other Services 0.044 0.031** 
 
Dummy variables for trade union status: 
  
1. Covered member 0.242 0.076*** 
2. Covered non-member 0.123 0.100*** 
3. Not covered member 0.085 0.031*** 
4. Not covered non-member 0.549 0.794*** 
 
Dummy variables for flexible working 
arrangements: 
  
1. Flexitime 0.140 0.045*** 
2. Annualized hours contract 0.049 0.029*** 
3. Term time working 0.054 0.001*** 
4. Other flexible arrangement 0.028 0.014*** 
5. No flexible arrangement 0.073 0.910*** 
 
Hourly wage 
  
Real hourly wage 11.806 6.627*** 
Log of real hourly wage 2.303 1.816*** 
 
Housing Tenure & Benefits 
  
1. Outright Owner 0.172 0.007*** 
2. Owned with Mortgage 0.621 0.080*** 
3.Private Renter 0.114 0.812*** 
4. Social Housing 0.093 0.101 
Claims any benefits 0.306 0.251*** 
   
Observations 112,408 1,396 
 
Source: UK QLFS 2005-2012.  
Notes: Numbers in table are sample means; total sample size is 113,804 observations; the sample size for 
average wage calculations is 28,521; *** Sample mean difference significant at 1%; ** at 5%.   
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